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The pay-as-you-go social security system, increasingly burdened by dwindling labor force, can benefit
from immigrants whose birth rates exceed those of the native born birth. The paper examines adynamic
political-economy mechanism through which the social security system influences the young decisive
voter’s attitudes in favor of a more liberal immigration regime. A Markov equilibrium with social
security consists of a more liberal migration policy, than a corresponding equilibrium with no social
security. Thus, the social security system effectively provides an incentive to liberalize migration policy




















The pay-as-you-go social security system, increasingly burdened by
dwindling labor force, can beneﬁt from immigrants whose birth rates
exceed those of the native born birth. The paper examines adynamic
political-economy mechanism through which the social security system
inﬂuences the young decisive voter’s attitudes in favor of a more liberal
immigration regime. A Markov equilibrium with social security consists
of a more liberal migration policy, than a corresponding equilibrium with
no social security. Thus, the social security system eﬀectively provides
an incentive to liberalize migration policy through a political-economy
mechanism.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F22, H55, J11, P16
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
All over the world, the combination of declining birth rates, and rising life
expectancy, presents major ﬁscal challenge to the social security system. From
an economic perspective, a rise in the dependency ratio (i.e., the proportion of
retirees per worker) increases the number of people drawing from the system,
while it decreases the number of contributors to the system. Because Immigrants
typically have higher birth rates than the native-born population of the host
countries, immigration may help pay PAYG social security system. That is, the
inﬂow of immigrants can help alleviate the current demographic imbalance by
inﬂuencing the age structure of the host economy, in a way which strengthens
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1the social security system. This paper analyzes a political-economy mechanism
through which social security systems inﬂuence the degree of liberalization of
the immigration policy.
Our analysis of the dynamic interactions between the political and economic
decisions is conducted in an analytical framework, developed by Krussel and
Rios-Rull (1996) and Krusell, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (1997). Our paper also
follows Forni (2006), who provides a neat analysis of Markov sub-game perfect
equilibrium of pay-as-you-go social security system in an overlapping generations
model with capital accumulation.
Earlier literature on the political economics of immigration includes Ben-
habib and Jovanovitch (1996), Scholten and Thum (1996), and Ortega (2005).
The present paper draws heavily on Sand and Razin (2007), who analyze a
political-economy equilibrium model, in which both migration and taxes in-
teract, focusing on the intergenerational aspects of the social security and
migration regimes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the analytical frame-
work. Section 3 presents the political economy equilibrium. In Section 4 we
characterize the equilibrium with a social security system. In section 5 we char-
acterize the equilibrium with no social security system. Section 6 concludes.
2 Analytical Framework
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of representative individ-
uals, who live for two periods. The tax-transfer system is a "pay as you go",
where in every period the government levies a ﬂat tax on the wage income of the
young generation and pays social security beneﬁts paid to the old generation.
The representative individual makes labour-leisure and saving-consumption de-
cisions, and pays social security taxes, in the ﬁrst period of her life. The in-
dividual retires in the second period. The retired individual receives interest
income from private savings (made in the ﬁrst period, when she was young),
and social security beneﬁts. Migrants enter the economy when young, and gain
the right to vote only in the next period, when old. They have the same pref-
erences as those of the native born, except from having a higher birth rate. We
assume that n>0 is the native-born birth rate, and m(>n ) is the birth rate
of migrants. On arrival, migrants are fully integrated into the social security
system. That is, they pay the social security tax when young, and receive the
social security beneﬁts when old. Oﬀspring of immigrants are like native born
in all respects (in particular, they have the same birth rate as the oﬀspring of
2the native born). As is standard in such Diamond type overlapping generations
model, the aggregate savings of the current young population generates next pe-
riod aggregate capital. The latter is used as a factor of production, along with
the labour input in the next period. The production function exhibits constant
returns to scale. Both the wage rate and the rate of interest, are endogenously
determined along the equilibrium path.
The utility of the representative young individual is logarithmic:






βLog(bt+1 +( 1+r)st) (1)
and the utility function of the representative old individual is given by:
Uo(st−1,b t)=bt +( 1+r)st−1 (2)
where is τt is period t tax rate, st is period t individual saving, bt+1 is period
t+1 social security beneﬁts, lt is period t individual labor supply, wt is period
t wage rate, and rt is period t interest rate.
The production function is of a Cobb-Douglas form, which is assumed to use





where Kt is the aggregate amount of capital,γt is the ratio of migrants to the
young native born population, and Nt =( 1+γt)lt is period t aggregate labor
supply (native born and migrants).
The wage rate and interest rate are determined competitively by the mar-
ginal productivity conditions (for simplicity, capital is assumed to depreciate
completely at the end of the period):








t − 1, (5)
where kt is capital per (native-born) worker. The balanced government budget
constraint is derived as in the previous section:
bt+1 =
τt+1wt+1lt+1[(1 + n)+γt(1 + m)](1 + γt+1)
(1 + γt)
(6)
3The saving-consumption decisions of young individuals are made by maxi-
mizing their utility while taking the prices and policy choices as given, and the














t = wt(1 − τt) (8)








Solving equations (20) and (21) for bt+1 and substituting bt+1 in equations (15)































(1 + γt)wtlt(1 − τt)(1 − f(τt+1))
1+n + γt(1 + m)
(11)
lΨ
t = wt(1 − τt) (12)
lΨ
t+1 = wt+1(1 − τt+1), (13)
Now, substituting bt from equation (20) and kt from equation (23), and using











t = wt(1 − τt), (15)
As expected, the old individual favours a maximizing-revenue level of the
social security tax rate ( the "Laﬀer Point"), τ∗ = Ψ
Ψ+1, and the largest immi-
gration quota,γ =1 .
42.1 Political-Economic Equilibrium
The Markov Perfect equilibrium is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 A Markov perfect political equilibrium is a vector of policy deci-
sion rules, Π =( T,G), and private decision rule, S,w h e r eT :[ 0 ,1] −→ [0,1],i s
the tax policy rule, τt = T(kt),a n dG :[ 0 ,1] −→ [0,1], is the immigration policy
rule, γt = G(kt),a n dS(kt) is the saving decision rule so that kt+1 = S(πt,k t),
such that the following functional equations hold:
(1) b Π(kt) = argmaxπt V i(γt−1,πt,πt+1)








with τt+1 = T(S(kt)).
(3) A ﬁxed-point condition requiring that given the next period policy outcome
(the vector of policy decision rules- Π(kt+1), the maximization of the indirect
utility of the current decisive voter, subject to the law of motion of the capital
stock, will reproduce the same law of motion, b Π(kt)=Π(kt), (as in condition
(1)).
This means that in equilibrium, policy variables have to maximize the deci-
sive voter’s indirect utility function, while taking into account the law of motion
of capital, and the expectations that the next period decision rules depend on
next period capital per (native-born) worker, which is equal to period t savings.
3 Equilibrium With Social Security
The Markov sub-game Perfect equilibrium is as follows.










































k(τ)=( ( 1 +
(1−α)






Ψ+α ) ,f o rτ = τ and τ =0 ,
where c is a constant of integration (see Appendix).
First, we explain why the equilibrium tax function τ(k) is decreasing in k,
in the range k ∈[k(τ),k(0)]. When the next period tax rate rises there are two
conﬂicting forces at work on tax revenues, as usual . The increase in rates , for
a given tax, increases revenues. base On one hand, an increase in period t+1
tax rate, for a given tax base, raises period t+1 tax revenues, and thereby social
security beneﬁts. But the tax increase reduces the labor supply and diminishes
the tax base. If the tax rate is below the Laﬀer point, which is always desireable
by the voter, the tax revenue must increase with the rise in the tax rate. If
the tax revenue, and thereby also the social security beneﬁts, rise in period t+1,
the incentive to save in period t diminishes, as required by the Euler ﬁst-order
condition. Because aggregate savings in period t are equal to the aggregate cap-
ital stock in period t+1, the rise in period t+1 tax rate diminishes the aggregate
capital stock in period t+1. Hence tax function τ(k) is decreasing in k,i nt h e
range k ∈[k(τ),k(0)]. At the threshold point τ,t h ev a l u eo fτ(k) is driven to
zero.
Turning to the equilibrium migration quota, consider the expression for γ∗.The
positive term in the numerator on the right hand side captures the beneﬁcial
eﬀect of having larger labor force with the immigrants’ oﬀspring. The larger
labor force in strengthens the social security system. The negative term in the
numerator the expression for γ∗ c a p t u r e st h ew a g ed e p r e s s i n ge ﬀect of immi-
grants, which is harmful to the young decisive voter. Consider as a benchmark
the case m=n. In this case the beneﬁcial eﬀect of migration, from the perspec-
tive of the decisive voter, which arises from the increase in the period t+1 share
of the young working force in the total population, vanishes completely. The
wage depression eﬀect dominates, and the migration quota is set equal to zero.
If, however, m>n, a beneﬁcial economic eﬀect to bring in migrants does exist.
For a suﬃciently large gap between m and n, the young decisive voter in period
t, anticipating an increase in social security beneﬁts in period t+1, will admit
immigrants. In this case γ∗ > 0.
Observe also that there is a positive eﬀect of the aging of the native born on
the migration quota, captured by a reduction in n.
64 Equilibrium With No Social Security
In order to emphasize the role of the social security system in the model, we now
consider a similar model, but without any transfer payments from the young to
the old.
















We can now compare migration policies with and without a social security
system. Inspecting the equilibrium migration policies with, and without social
security, we can verify that in the former migration policies are either the same,
or more liberal, than in the latter regime, depending on the range in which the
equilibrium levels of the capital per worker are. The conclusion is that the social
security system creates an incentive, through a political-economy mechanism,
for a country to bring in migrants.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The pay-as-you-go social security system, which in recent time suﬀers from
dwindling labor force, can beneﬁt from immigrants with birth rates that exceed
the native-born birth rates. Thus, a social security system provides eﬀectively
an incentive, through the political economy mechanism, to liberalize migration
policy. The paper examines a political- economic, inter-generational, mechanism
through which the social security system aﬀects voter attitudes in favor of more
liberal immigration regime. We demonstrate that the Markov equilibrium with
social security consists of more liberal migration policies than the corresponding
Markov equilibrium with no social security.
The main prediction of the model is that countries with a more compre-
hensive (Beveridgian-type) social security system, will be more liberal in their
migration policies.
Related empirical work (e.g., Cohen and Razin(2009) demonstrates that
there exists a statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of the generosity of the
7welfare state on the skill composition of migration. Skill migrants, who pro-
vides ﬁscal beneﬁts, are more desirable than unskilled migrants, who constitute
a ﬁscal burden for the welfare state.
6 Appendix
Proof. The proof of the proposition is as follows. Because n>0, the majority
resides with the young voters. Thus, the policy decisions concerning the tax
rate and migration quotas maximizes the young indirect utility function. (We
follow the proof of Forni (2004) to derive the tax policy decision rule.) The
policy decision rules are derived by using, as a constraint, the ﬁrst derivative
with respect to the policy variables of the logarithm of the capital accumulation















Ψ+α ,and c is a positive constant of integration. The policy
decision rule of the immigration quotas is at its maximal value, and the policy










.T h u s w e c a n
rewrite the policy decision rule of the tax rate as: k(τt)=kt. The function k(τ)
is decreasing in τ,f o rτ ∈ [0,τ],w h e r eτ =
Ψ(1+β)+α
Ψ(1+β)+α+β, and increasing in τ,
for τ ∈ [τ,1]. Thus, according to equation (21), for every value of capital per
(native-born) worker, kt, there are two solutions for τ(kt) in the range [0,1).
The solution which satisﬁes the equilibrium conditions, which is denoted by
τ(kt),i sd e c r e a s i n gi nkt for kt ∈ [k(τ),k(0)].
The solution for the policy variables given in equations (21) and (22), will
be proved to satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions of the problem. The young voter’s
indirect utility function under the assumption that next period decisive voter is
young, which sets next period policy decision rules for the tax rate and immi-
gration quotas to be τt+1 = τ(kt+1),and γt+1 =1respectively, can be written



























−λ2(τt − 1) − λ3(−τt) − λ4(γt − 1) − λ5(γt)
(23)





































































(1 + γt)wtlt(1 − τt)(1 − f(τ(kt+1))
1+n + γt(1 + m)
(27)
τt − 1 ≤ 0,λ 2 ≥ 0 and λ2(τt − 1) = 0 (28)
−τt ≤ 0,λ 3 ≥ 0 and λ3(−τt)=0 (29)
γt − 1 ≤ 0,λ 4 ≥ 0 and λ4(γt − 1) = 0 (30)
−γt ≤ 0,λ 5 ≥ 0 and λ5(γt)=0 (31)












1+n + γt(1 + m)
¶
−λ4+λ5=0 (33)
Because m>n,f r o me q u a t i o n(33) we can derive that γt has a corner solution.
The solution for the tax rate, on the other hand, τt, may be bounding or not,
meaning that τt = τ(kt) ∈ [0,1]1. Substituting the solutions for the tax and
openness rate into the indirect utility of the young, we obtain that the optimal
solution for the openness rate is γt =1 .
The optimal solutions should also satisfy the second order suﬃcient condi-
tion, meaning that the bordered Hessian of the Lagrangian should be negatively
deﬁned. Since the solution of the immigration quotas is a corner solution where
the largest immigration quota maximizes the young voter’s indirect utility func-




















1Note that the utility with τt =1is equal to minus inﬁnity. Thus, the range for the tax
rate is [0,1).
9where gτ and gk are the derivatives of the constraint of the capital per (native-
born) worker from equation (27) with respect to τt and kt+1 respectively. The














α (1 − τt)−
β(1−α)
















α (1 − τt)−
β(1−α)








Denote by [τ1,τ2] the range of the tax rate for which the bordered Hessian of
the Lagrangian is negatively deﬁned. Since τ1 is always negative, and tax rate
is deﬁned over the range τ ∈ [0,1], the range of the capital optimal solution for
the tax rate, τ(kt),i sd e ﬁned in the range kt ∈ [k(τ),k(0)], where the function
k(τ) is decreasing in τ.
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